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The primary objective of this thesis is to port two Trusted Services – The Trusted 
Computing Base Extension (TCB) Server and the Secure Session Server, which are 
currently implemented for the XTS-300 in NPS’s Multilevel Secure Local Area Network 
(MLS LAN) Project, to the Linux Operating System (kernel version 2.2.16, build 22) 
running on an Intel Pentium Processor.   
A.   BACKGROUND 
      1. Purpose 
This thesis is a continuation of an ongoing Naval Postgraduate School effort to 
develop a high assurance Multilevel Secure Local Area Network (MLS LAN) that 
incorporates commercial-off-the-shelf client workstations to provide multiple users with 
simultaneous access to stored data at different sensitivity levels.   As an additional 
requirement, it should be cost effective and easy to use in an office environment.   This 
thesis will build upon this project by including in the network environment a modern, open 
source operating system, Linux. 
  Currently, in the MLS LAN, the TCB and Secure Session Servers are part of a TCB 
that includes the TCB of the previously evaluated Class B3 high assurance server, the Wang 
Government Services Incorporated XTS-300TM Operating System.   
Currently, the NPS research team has modified the XTS-300 to support many MLS 
LAN TCB requirements, such as Secure Attention Key (SAK) recognition and processing, 
user access identification and authentication (I&A), session control and TCP/IP 
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configuration management.   The port of these services, which are not all inclusive, to Linux 
will permit further experimentation with MLS architectural issues in a more flexible and 
more easily modifiable environment.    
This thesis will not attempt to implement any Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
based policies used in the current MLS LAN.  This will be left for future work. 
After completion of this thesis, the Linux-incorporated TCB Extension Server and 
Secure Session Server will show that the XTS-300 TCB services can be ported to Linux 
system as a single level system, ultimately moving towards a more security enhanced 
implementation.    
     2. Project Overview 
One of the major components of the MLS LAN is the Trusted Computing Base 
(TCB).   However, in order to extend a “Trusted Path” between TCB services and remote 
clients over the MLS LAN, a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE), MLS LAN 
Connection Protocols, TCB Extension Server, and Secure Session Server are also needed.   
These components ensure that  “communications via the trusted path shall be activated 
exclusively by a user of the TCB and shall be logically isolated and unmistakably 
distinguishable from other paths.”[Ref.1]  This thesis will focus primarily on the TCB 
Extension Server and the Secure Session Server.   The TCB Extension Server’s function is 
to extend the TCB perimeter securely over a LAN to the requesting TCBE-equipped 
workstation, whereas the Secure Session Server is responsible for accepting connections 
from TCBE-equipped client workstations and establishing the TCP/IP protocol service for 
the user.  In the target architecture, the TCB and Secure Session Servers will be imported 
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              Figure 1-1: Proposed System Architecture 
 3. MLS LAN Project Goals 
The MLS LAN is an effort to provide governmental and commercial organizations 
th a cost effective, multilevel networking solution by leveraging existing high assurance 
hnology.  The ultimate goal of the project is to demonstrate a prototype network design 
t offers the ability to provide concurrent high assurance access for network users to data 
multiple sensitivity levels through the incorporation of inexpensive commercial personal 
mputers and software.  The intended design of the network is to integrate the security 
tures of a previously evaluated Class B3 high assurance server, the Wang Government 
rvices Incorporated XTS-300, with the conveniences of up-to-date operating systems and 
 latest commercial office automation software.  The current plan for the MLS LAN 
twork is to provide this functionality using the universally accepted TCP/IP protocol suite 
allow our multilevel networking functionality to be layered on top of any chosen 
hnology used in the lower layers of the OSI model.  When completed, the MLS LAN will 
vide a cost effective multilevel solution within an easy-to-use office environment.   
      4. Thesis Goals 
This thesis is focused on researching the Linux Operating System, (Kernel version 
.16 build 22), modifying Application Program Interfaces (APIs) and relevant functions 
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with the purpose of incorporating the MLS TCB Extension Server and Secure Session 
Server into the Linux Operating environment.  It is not the intent of this thesis to overhaul 
the Linux operating system, nor will the solution be designed to satisfy any of the 
International Standards Organization’s (ISO) Common Criteria ratings relating to Multilevel 
Secure Systems. 
A major benefit of porting the Trusted Computing Base Extension Server and Secure 
Session Server, used in the MLS LAN architecture, to a Linux Kernel is to take advantage 
of the functionalities incorporated in a more modern operating system, including shared 
libraries, shared copy-on-write executables, demand loading, TCP/IP networking, true 
multitasking, and more advanced memory management. 
  5. Advantages of Linux vs. the XTS-300 
There numerous UNIX versions, however Linux has been chosen for this port based 
on capabilities, legal issues, useability, economical issues and ease of portability benefits. 
a.  Capabilites 
 The STOP 4.4.2 operating system could possibly be termed a “traditional” 
UNIX system, since it is based upon the UNIX System V.3 implemetaion and lack many of 
the System V.4 features.   Generally, “traditional” UNIX systems are designed to run on a 
single processor and lack the ability to protect their data structures from concurrent access 
by multiple processors.  Moreover, the “traditional” UNIX kernel is not very versatile, 
supporting only a single type of file system, process scheduling policy, and executable 
format.  The “tradtional” UNIX kernel is not designed to be extensible and has few facilities 
for code reuse.  The result is that, as new features have been added to the various 
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“traditional” UNIX versions, a lot of new code had to be added, yeilding a bloated and 
unmodular kernel [Ref 3]. 
Another disadvantage is that the XTS-300 is a hardware dependent platform.  It’s 
source code is written to run on an i386 based processor.   
 Linux tries to maintain a distinction between hardware-dependent and hardware 
independent source code.  Both the /arch and /include directories include nine subdirectories 
corresponding to the nine hardware platforms supported.  The standard platforms are 
outlined in table 1-2. 
 
 
Chip Architecture Platform 
arm Acorn personal computers (Now part of 
Broadcom Inc.) 
alpha Compaq Alpha Workstations 
i386 IBM compatible PC’s based upon Intel 
80x86 or Intel 80x86 compatible 
processors 
m68k PC’s based upon Motorola MC680x0 
microprocessors 
mips Workstations based on Silicon Graphics 
MIPS processors 
ppc Workstations based on Motorola-IBM 
PowerPC microprocessors 
sparc Workstations based on Sun 
Microsystems SPARC microprocessors 
sparc64 Workstations based on Sun 
Microsystems 64-bit Ultra SPARC 
microprocessors 
s390 IBM System /390 mainframes 
                             Table 1-1: Hardware Architectures supported by Linux 
b.  Linux is  Readily Available 
Linux has been copyrighted under the terms of the GNU General Public  
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License (GPL)1.   This is a license written by the Free Software Foundation (FSF)  that is 
designed to prevent people from restricting the distribution of software.   In summary, a user 
can charge as much as he or she likes for some particular software, but can't prevent the 
person it was sold  to from giving it away for free.   It also means that the source code is 
open source and must also be available.  This is useful for programmers and developers. The 
license also says that anyone who modifies the program must also make his or her version 
freely redistributable.  
c. Usability 
Another adavantage Linux has is its wide support for graphical user 
interfaces, including The X Window System.   This program, from MIT,  allows computers 
to create graphical windows, and is used on many different UNIX platforms.  Although the 
XTS-300 does provide support for X Windows, it does not readily support many of the 
freely available desktops such as GNOME and KDE. 
d. Portability 
                                                
Linux is highly compatible with many common operating systems.  For  
example, you can mount file systems from many other operating systems such as MS-DOS 
MS Windows, SVR4, OS/2, Mac OS, Solaris, SunOS, NeXTSTEP, and many BSD variants, 
and so on.  You can operate with many network architectures like ethernet, Fiber Distributed 
Data Interface (FDDI), etc., and by using suitable libraries, Linux is able to run programs 
written for other operating systems. [Ref. 8]    
 
1 The GNU Project is coordinated by the Free Software Foundation, Inc (http://www.gnu.org); its aim is to 
implement a whole operating system freely useable by everyone. The availability of the GNU C compiler has 
been essential for the success of the Linux project [Ref. 8]. 
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Linux has been ported to a number of platforms.  It runs on Compaq  
Alpha AXP, Sun SPARC and UltraSPARC, Motorola 68000, PowerPC, PowerPC64, ARM, 
Hitachi SuperH, IBM S/390, MIPS, HP PA-RISC, Intel IA-64 and DEC VAX.  Ports are 
currently in progress to the AMD x86-64 architecture.  
e. Economic Benefits 
 Linux is free. You can install a complete UNIX system at no expense other 
than that for hardware. Therefore, porting to the Linux operating system allows us to go 
from a more limited environment to a more flexible one, with little or no cost. 
  6.   Disadvantages of Linux vs. XTS-300 
The only true disadvantage relevant to this thesis is that  Linux only incorporates 
Discretionary Access Controls (DAC) and does not provide Mandatory Access Controls 
(MAC).  MAC and DAC will be explained in Chapter II. 
 7.  Methodology 
• Linux Red Hat 7.0 (Kernel version 2.2.16 Build 22) and Wang XTS-300 
interfaces will be analyzed to identify the existing design, primary data 
structures, libraries, Application Program Interfaces, functional dependencies 
(internal and external), etc. 
• Use a UNIX based development environment to develop and/or modify code for 
porting to the Linux environment. 
• Use a run/test environment to debug and test new code. 
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Interact with the designers and users of the MLS LAN project in order to keep the 
implementation within the scope of the system’s original design while enhancing its appeal 
and potential use in a more modern, less expensive environment. 
B.   CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
       1. Introduction 
This thesis is composed of six chapters.  This chapter provides the motivation, 
objectives, research questions, scope and methodology employed to conduct the research.  
Chapter II provides descriptions and comparisons of the XTS-300 and Linux security and 
software architectures.  Chapter III discusses XTS-300 and Red Hat Linux porting 
environments.   Chapter IV describes the ported modules and databases.  Chapter V 
describes the major source code changes in the port.  Chapter VI presents Conclusions and 
Recommendations.  Appendix A provides a glossary of terms.  Each of these Chapters is 
outlined below. 
2.   The XTS-300 and Linux System Architectures 
a.  XTS-300 
The XTS-300 product is a combination of STOP 4.4.2, a multilevel secure  
operating system, and a Wang-supplied x86 hardware base.  Its system architecture is 
designed to implement the concept of a Trusted Computing Base.  The primary software 
components are the Security Kernel, TCB System Services (TSS), Trusted Software, and the 
Commodity Application System Software (CASS).  The Security Kernel provides basic 
 8
system operating services and enforces system security.  The TSS software provides general 
trusted services to the XTS-300 application and system software.  Trusted Software provides 
additional security services outside the Security Kernel.  Finally, CASS provides an 
execution environment on the XTS-300 for UNIX-based applications.  The TCB Extension 
Server and Secure Session Server run as trusted software. 
b.  Linux   
The Linux operating system was initially developed in 1991 by Linus  
Torvalds for IBM-compatible 32-bit x86-based PCs (386 or higher).  It is a clone of the 
UNIX operating system and was written entirely from scratch,.  It has all the features of a 
modern (System V Release 4 and 4.4BSD) fully-fledged UNIX, including true multitasking, 
virtual memory, shared libraries, demand loading, shared copy-on-write executables, better 
memory management, and TCP/IP networking.  
Unlike the XTS-300, where the CPU runs in the four execution state 
(Rings), the Linux kernel only makes uses of Kernel mode (Ring 0) and User Mode (Ring 
3).  The TCB Extension Server and Secure Session Server will be ported to run in the User 
Mode environment. 
 3. XTS-300 and Linux Porting Environments  
The XTS-300’s STOP, version 4.4.2, operating system is designed to support much 
of the UNIX System V.3 interface for applications software.   Linux implements many 
features found in the System V.4 and 4.4BSD strains of UNIX, but does not necessarily 
adhere to them in all cases.  It is mostly POSIX.1 compliant (IEEE Std 1003.1-1988). 
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There a many specific API services, library and system calls, used in XTS-300’s 
System V.3 interface that may be incorporated differently or in some cases more effectively 
in a POSIX.1 interface. This chapter will delineate portability issues between System V.3 
interface and the POSIX.1 interface, specific to an XTS-300-to-Linux port. 
 4. Ported Mechanisms 
This chapter describes the TCB Extension and SSS servers and how their execution 
domains compare between the XTS-300 and Linux environments. 
 5. Source Code Transforms to the Linux Environment 
This chapter details the changes to source code, and the significant compile and link 
errors that occurred during the XTS-300 to Linux port.   
 6.  Results and Recommendations 
This chapter outlines results such as performance, dependency issues, security and 
future recommendations. 
C.   APPENDIX OVERVIEW 
       1. Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
Appendix A provides a glossary of common terms. 




II. THE XTS-300 AND LINUX SECURITY AND MAJOR COMPNENTS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Developed by Bell Laboratories in 1969, UNIX has evolved from a single operating 
system to a family of operating systems, examples of which include AIX, BSDI, FreeBSD, 
HP-UX, IRIX, Linux, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Pyramid, SCO (UnixWare and OpenServer), 
Solaris, SunOS, and Tru64 UNIX.   Other mainstream operating systems, such as Windows 
NT, have UNIX roots.  Additionally, the XTS-300 has a UNIX-like interface. 
This chapter will briefly discuss the security policies enforced by the XTS-300 and 
Linux. Additionally, the conceptual software and hardware components will also be 
discussed.   
B.  DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a means of restricting access to objects based 
on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong [Ref. 15].     Typical UNIX 
file system objects are discretionary, because the user can change access modes of the object 
at his or her discretion.  In UNIX and many other systems, DAC is always tied directly to 
User Identification Numbers (UID's). The simplest implementation of this is that of 
permission bits which support owner/group/world permission bits or read/write/execute.  
The most common object that a typical user deals with is a file.  File permissions are 
defined by the file mode.  The file mode contains nine bits that determine access 
permissions to the file, plus three special bits.  Access permissions are defined for three 
classes of users: the owner, the group, and the rest of the world.  
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In Linux, a concept that is typically applied is that of a root (UID 0) or super-user 
account.  This account is trusted and can bypass system security mechanisms.   It has all 
DAC permissions, thus overriding access controls on all Linux objects, and often, other 
implemented security settings.   
The POSIX.1 DAC standard specifies the use of a permission bit to signify a 
particular mode of access.  This standard allows the defined permissions of read, write and 
execute to be specified for:  
1. the file owner,  
2. the group of users specified as the ``owning group,'' and  
3. all other users (named ``other'').  
 
This mechanism can be cumbersome to use if permissions need to be specified for a 
named user who is not the owner (and it is nearly impossible to specify separate permissions 
for two users, neither of whom is the owner). It is also not possible to provide specific 
permissions for different named groups of users.  
Another concern is that DAC does not provide any way of restricting information 
flow once a valid subject has “legally” accessed an object.  This weakness makes DAC 
policies vulnerable to Trojan Horses maliciously leaking information.  Therefore the need 
arises for providing additional controls -- such as Mandatory Access Controls, that limit the 
indiscriminate flow of information in the system. 
 
C.   MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 
Systems enforce Mandatory Access Control (MAC) by restricting access to objects 
based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the 
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objects and the formal authorization (i.e. clearance) of subjects to access information of such 
sensitivity. [Ref. 15].   In mandatory access control schemes, the system protects the files 
and resources. This type of access can be implemented to handle a number of different 
security levels, such as Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Unclassified, Official Use 
Only, etc. 
The system applies an access control sensitivity label to every user, file, and resource 
in the system. By comparing the labels the system (not the system manager or user) 
determines which user can access what information in the system. 
A label consists of two parts:  
• A classification — a single hierarchical level to permit access, for example, Top 
Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified, etc. 
• A set of categories — a nonhierarchical set representing distinct areas of 
information, such as Combat Systems, Supply, Engineering, Operations, or Squadron, etc. 
D.   TRUSTED PATH 
A trusted path is a mechanism by which a user may directly interact with trusted 
software, which can only be activated by either the user or the trusted software and may not 
be imitated by other software. In the absence of a trusted path mechanism, malicious 
software may impersonate trusted software to the user or may impersonate the user to 
trusted software. Such malicious software could potentially obtain sensitive information, 
perform functions on behalf of the user in violation of the user’s intent, or trick the user into 
believing that a function has been invoked without actually invoking it. In addition to 
supporting trusted software in the base system, the trusted path mechanism should be 
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extensible to support the subsequent addition of trusted applications by a system security 
policy administrator.    
The concept of a trusted path can be generalized to include interactions beyond just 
those between trusted software and users. The MLS LAN uses the concept of a trusted 
channel for communication between trusted software on different network components such 
as a TCBE client and the TCB Extension Server. More generally, its mechanism guarantees 
a mutually authenticated channel, or protected path, to ensure that critical system functions 
are not being spoofed.   
 
E.   XTS-300 COMPONENTS 
       1. Introduction 
The major components of the XTS-300 are the STOP 4.4.2 multilevel secure 
operating system, and a Wang-supplied x86 hardware base.  Its system architecture is 
designed to support both a reference validation mechanism, or security kernel, and a 
Trusted Computing Base. 
This section will provide a brief description of the software and hardware 
components of the XTS-300.  If the reader wishes to obtain a detailed description of the 
software architecture and security model, refer to [Ref. 1].  Additionally, the security 
policies implemented in the XTS-300 will also be discussed.      
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 2.  Primary Software Components 
The primary software components are the Security Kernel, TCB System Services 
(TSS), Trusted Software, and the Commodity Application System Software (CASS).   
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The TSS software, which operates in the next-most-privileged ring (Ring 1) is 
controlled by the security kernel.  It implements a hierarchical file system, supports user I/O, 
and implements the remaining discretionary access control for both trusted and untrusted 
processes.  Throughout this thesis, the TSS software will also be referred to as Operating 
System Services (OSS) domain.   
Trusted Software and Commodity Application System Services (CASS), executing 
in Ring 2, provides additional security services and user functions outside the Security 
Kernel.  The ring is shared by the trusted software such as the STOP operating system or 
user developed trusted code and the untrusted CASS. CASS provides an execution 
environment for UNIX-based applications on the XTS-300.  The CASS is not considered a 
part of the TCB.   While executing in the CASS domain, a process may access information 
residing in a ring of the same or lesser privilege, but not in a ring of greater privilege [Ref. 
11].   Trusted Software functions allow system operators and administrators to perform 
security-related housekeeping and other privileged tasks not supported by the STOP 
components [Ref. 1]. 
Ring 3, Application Domain, is reserved for user processes and is the least 
privileged. 
   4.  Security Policy 
a. XTS-300 MAC 
The XTS-300 enforces the DOD policy for multilevel secure computing as  
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formalized in the obsolete Trusted Computer Security and Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)2 
and provides MAC that supports both mandatory security and integrity policies.  The multi-
level features of the XTS-300 allow separation of users who are at different clearance levels, 
and prevents a lower level user from reading a higher level user’s files or data.  The use of 
categories allows separation of the data between users at the same level, giving access to 
certain users on a mandatory need-to-know basis [Ref. 12].  The TCB provides sixteen (16) 
hierarchical security classifications and sixty-four (64) mutually independent security 
compartments or categories.  Eight (8) hierarchical integrity classifications and sixteen (16) 
mutually independent integrity compartments or categories are also provided by the TCB.   
The mandatory security policy enforced by the XTS-300 is based on the Bell  
and LaPadula security model [Ref. 9]; the mandatory integrity policy is based on the Biba 
integrity model [Ref. 10].   
b.  XTS-300 DAC  
                                                
The XTS-300 also implements discretionary access control (DAC), where  
access to an object is determined by the identity of the user and/or groups to which a user 
belongs.   
Specifically, the TCB enforces the following discretionary access rule: 
• Access modes – a user is only allowed to access a data object in the 
mode(s) granted by the owner of the object.  Each object has allowed 
permissions (read, write, execute) for the owner of the object, for the 
 
2 ISO/IEC 15408, the Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology (IT) Security Evaluation is the new 
standard for specifying and evaluating the security features of computer products and systems.  It has replaced 
the TCSEC [Ref. 19]. 
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members of the owner’s group, for other specifically identified users and 
groups, and for all others. 
The XTS-300 also enforces a general configurable policy that strengthens the  
traditional mandatory and discretionary access rules called Subtype policy [Ref 12].   
  Finally, the system provides for user identification and authentication needed 
for user ID-based policy enforcement.   
 
F.  LINUX COMPONENTS 
       1. Introduction 
The major components of the Linux port are comprised of Linux Red Hat 7.0 –
kernel 2.2-16 build 22 and an Intel Pentium III hardware base.  Unlike the XTS-300, the 
Linux system architecture is not designed to support any reference validation mechanism 
such as a security kernel, or a Trusted Computing Base.  The Linux kernel mainly 
implements a DAC security policy. 
This section will provide a brief description of the software and hardware 
components of the Linux port, and its implemented security policies. 
 
 2. Primary Software Components 
The Linux system architecture is designed to support a single monolithic kernel that 
runs in kernel mode, while all user programs run in user mode.   The kernel contains code 
for the file system, device drivers as well as code for process management.  In contrast, 
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UNIX has always managed large parts of many system functions, such as networking etc, 
outside the kernel, in user mode processes. 
Linux is a true UNIX kernel, although it is not a full UNIX operating system.  This is 
because does not include all the applications such as file system utilities, windowing 
systems and GUI desktops, system administrator commands, text editors, compilers, etc.  
However, since many of these programs are freely available under the GNU General Public 
License, they can be installed into one of the file systems supported by Linux [Ref. 8]. 
 
       3.   Hardware Abstraction 
As stated earlier, an Intel x86 microprocessor has four hardware privilege levels.  
However, Unlike the XTS-300, which uses all four hardware privilege levels, Linux systems 
support a Process/Kernel Model that only uses two levels of privilege-- Ring 0 (kernel) is 
the most privileged level, with complete access to all memory and CPU instructions, and 
Ring 3 (user programs) is the least privileged level.   Figure 2-2 provides a general hardware 
abstraction model of the Linux operating system.    
When a process is running in Ring 3, it is said to be in User Mode and cannot 
directly access the kernel data structures or kernel programs.  Therefore the process should 
only be able to make well-defined kernel calls through kernel system interface.   However, 
when a process is running in Ring 0, it is said to be in kernel mode, and the aforementioned 
restrictions no longer apply.   A process will switch from user mode (Ring 3) to kernel mode 
(Ring 0) when making certain API function calls that require a higher privilege level, such 
as those that involve accessing files or performing graphics-related functions.   In fact, many 
user-level threads can spend more time in kernel mode than in user mode. 
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A system (kernel) call is implemented by a trap, which is a  "software exception" 
that transfers control to the kernel (Ring 0); in Linux, for the x86, this is a software interrupt 
(also called a "gate") [Ref. 16].   When the Kernel Mode functions are completed, the kernel 
transfers control back to user mode.  Transferring modes between the kernel and user space 
prevents a programmer from being able to write user mode instructions that can run 
privileged instructions in kernel mode, thus not providing any security or fault tolerance 
mechanisms.  In order to implement these mechanisms, the hardware must permit the kernel 
to verify the input parameters e.g. valid buffer addresses, restore the saved states during the 
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Ring 0  provided for security.   The most 
 is implemented in the form of file 
s allow a list of user-specific rights 
to be placed on objects, thus allowing users to make a determination as to the security that 
should be applied to their data.   Typically DAC controls are placed on all Linux file system 
objects such as semaphores, shared memory, files, devices, etc. 
Linux developers have slowly been implementing extra security features, called 
capabilities, which have been added to the 2.1.x and 2.2.x kernels.  Still, not a lot of 
software takes advantage of these new features [Ref. 13].   The premise is to strip out the 
root, or super-user account (almost every attack revolves around obtaining "root") and 
replace it with a concept of Least Privilege.  The idea behind Least Privilege is to create a 
system where processes are given specific abilities that are limited solely to the tasks that 
they are performing.   
The main advantage of using capabilities is its simplicity.  With just a couple of bits, 
many permission scenarios can be modeled.  Also, without the existence of root, many of 
today’s Linux security vulnerabilities can be eliminated since there would be no root 
account to access. As stated earlier, the root account is trusted and can bypass system 
security mechanisms.   It has all DAC permissions, thus overriding access controls on all 
Linux objects, and often, other implemented security settings.   
G.  SUMMARY 
Although Linux and XTS-300 are both UNIX-like Architectures, Linux is not  
designed as a trusted computing system.   The XTS-300 implements Mandatory and 
Discretionary security policies whereas Linux only implements minimal DAC.  Linux has 
no concept of a TCB or trusted and untrusted code, therefore the system administrator can 
not implement security policies and procedures related to a trusted computing system. 
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Consequently, when porting from the XTS-300 to Linux, all of the MAC security polices 
that the XTS-300 offer are lost.  Linux will only execute the TCB Extension and SSS 
Servers in the user domain (Ring 3).  Table 2-1 summarizes the architectural abstractions 
and Security Models implemented in the XTS-300 and Linux. 
 
Security Models Environment Arch. 
Abstraction 
(Rings) DAC MAC 
Kernel 
Linux 0,3 X None Linux 2.2.16-22 
XTS-300 0,1,2,3 X Bell-
LePadula 
Biba STOP 4.4.2 
Table 2-1: XTS-300 and Linux Architectures 
 












III. XTS-300 and LINUX PORTING ENVIRONMENTS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The latest commercial variants of UNIX, such as Linux, are derived from either 
System V Release 4 (SVR4)3 or 4.4 Berkley Software Distribution (BSD) release from the 
University of California at Berkley (4.4 BSD).   
SVR4 is a product of AT&T’s UNIX System Laboratories. It is a merging of AT&T 
UNIX System Release 3.2, Sun Microsystems SunOS system, the 4.3BSD release from the 
University of California, and the Xenix system from Microsoft.  The source code was 
released in late 1989 with the first end-user copies being available during 1990 [Ref. 18].   It 
is almost a total rewrite of the System V kernel and produced a clean, if complex 
implementation [Ref. 3]. 
4.4 BSD is widely used in academic installations and has served as the basis for a 
number of commercial UNIX products.  Released in 1992, 4.4BSD is the final version of 
BSD to be released, with the design and implementation organization subsequently 
dissolved [Ref. 3]. 
 The SVR4 and 4.4 BSD implementations tend to agree on some common standards 
like IEEE’s Portable Operating Systems based on UNIX (POSIX); the existing IEEE Std 
1003.1, 1996 version, IEEE Standard for POSIX--Part 1.    
Theoretically, UNIX applications ported to the Linux operating system can be 
completed with very little effort.  Linux, and the GNU C library used by it, have been 
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designed with application portability in mind, meaning that many applications will compile 
simply through the use of the make4 utility.   Even so, it may not be trivial to port from the 
XTS-300 to Linux since the SVR4 UNIX interface was a major upgrade from SVR3’s.  
Linux derives much of its functionality from SVR4.  
This chapter provides an analysis of the major issues associated with porting from  
the XTS-300 to Linux, highlighting the differences between the Linux interfaces, which 
attempt to be POSIX.1 compliant and the XTS-300 interfaces which are based on the 
System V Release 3. 
  
  1.  Linux 
                                                                                                                                                     
Linux is combination of the System V Release 4 and 4.4BSD  interfaces.   Linux 
Kernel Version 2.2, and beyond, aims to be compliant with the IEEE Std 1003.1-1988 
(POSIX.1) standard. [Ref. 8].  By itself, the Linux kernel is not very innovative.  When 
Linus Torvalds wrote the first Linux kernel, he referenced some classical books on UNIX 
internals, like Maurice Bach’s The Design of the UNIX Operating System (Prentice Hall, 
1986).  Therefore, Linux has some bias towards the UNIX baseline described in Bach’s 
book (i.e. SVR4).   However Linux does not stick to any particular variant of UNIX.  
Instead, it tries to adopt good features and design choices of several different UNIX kernels 
[Ref. 8]. 
In general, Linux has been designed to be compatible with older UNIX 
implementations.  This compatibility is intended to make application porting easier; and, in 
 
3 SVR4 draws on the efforts of both commercial and academic designers and was developed to provide a 
uniform platform for commercial UNIX deployment.[Ref 3] 
4 The make utility is a tool for organizing and facilitating the update of executables or other files which are 
built from one or more constituent files. 
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a number of instances, has improved upon or corrected behavior found in those 
implementations.    
Moreover, Linux includes all of the features of a modern operating system, like 
virtual memory, a virtual file system, lightweight processes, reliable signals, SVR4 
interprocess communications, support for Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) systems, etc. 
 
 2.   XTS-300 
The XTS-300’s STOP operating system is designed not only to support much of the 
UNIX System V.3 interface for applications software, but to produce and run object 
programs that adhere to a subset of the "Intel386 Family Binary Compatibility Specification 
2" as well [Ref. 17].  The XTS-300 includes many of the Linux features mentioned above, 
but many of them are provided in different ways.  For example, SVR3 provides reliable 
signals in a way that differs from POSIX.1 [Ref. 18]. 
 
B.  PORTING MODEL 
The porting model used in this thesis represents a simple example of source-level 
porting.  The XTS-300 source code is transported from its environment to Linux’s, and 
adaptation occurs primarily in the Linux target environment.   The TCB Extension Server, 
Secure Session Server and related source code are transported to the Linux environment, 
while adapting the configuration file flags, options and Macros.  After various modifications 
to the source code in the Linux environment, the code will be compiled and linked (using 


































                                              Figure 3-1: Porting Mo
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The XTS-300 uses TCB gate interfaces and OSS domain library routines defined in 
Ref. 12.   On the XTS-300, most of the include files required for invoking the TCB gates 
and OSS domain library routines are located in /usr/include/stop directory. The library 
contents include the OSS domain library routines, TCB gate interfaces and some standard C 
library routines.   The OSS domain library is contained in the file /lib/liboss.a. 
The OSS domain library, liboss.a, cannot be used in the Linux environment because 
the source code is not available for compilation in the Linux environment.  Therefore many 
of the OSS function calls will be replaced with function calls in Linux’s libc.a library, 
located in /usr/lib/libc.a.  Additionally, the TCB gate calls used in the XTS-300 are replaced 
by Linux system interface calls.   
2. Signals 
The basic signal() function is a feature of ISO C, while sigaction() is a function 
defined as part of the POSIX.1 standard. Although sigaction() would be the preferred 
function, signal() is used in some instances to support cleaner portability.  
It is  possible to use both the signal() and sigaction() functions within a single program, but 
caution must be observed because they can interact in slightly strange ways. The sigaction() 
function, through its arguments, specifies more information than the signal() function, so the 
return value from signal() cannot express the full range of sigaction() possibilities.  
Therefore, if signal() is used to save and later reestablish an action, it may not be able to 
properly reestablish the handler that was initially created with sigaction().  If both 
sigaction() and signal() must be used together, the problem can be avoided by always using 
sigaction() to save and restore a handler if a program uses sigaction() at all.  Since 
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sigaction() is more general, it can properly save and reestablish any action, regardless of 
whether it was established originally with signal() or sigaction(). 
On some systems, if an action is established with signal() and then examined with 
sigaction(),  the handler address that was specified by signal() may not be the one provided 
to sigaction().   It may not even be suitable for use as an action argument with signal().  But 
it can be relied upon if it is used as an argument to sigaction().  This problem is not an issue 
in the targeted Linux environment.  
Many of the OSS domain signal-like functions were replaced with SV4 signal function calls 
where practical.  Since signals on SV4 platforms have some backwards compatibility with 
SV3 signals, in some instances SV3 signals were used in order to make the change cleaner.   
Table 3-1 lists the XTS-300 signal calls that were transformed to work in the Linux 
environment. 



















Table 3-1: Linux and XTS-300 Signal Translations 
 
3. System V IPC 
In the XTS-300 environment, various Inter-Process Communication (IPC) 
mechanisms exist for OSS domain programs and for Application domain programs (CASS 
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programs). Some of these mechanisms are only available for one type of program, and 
therefore, cannot be used as an IPC mechanism between domains.  
Linux does not have an OSS or CASS domain, however programs that run in the 
CASS domain on the XTS-300 can run in the user domain (Ring 3) in Linux.  OSS domain 
functions ported to Linux are replaced with equivalent SV4 IPC functions for messages, 
shared memory and semaphores.   
a.  Shared Memory 
When compiling, there is a conflict resolving the storage size of the structure  
shmid_ds defined in /stop/sys/shm.h.  It was not clear why this conflict exists, but the 
solution was to prohibit use of the shm.h file used by the /include directory in the XTS-300 
and instead use /usr/include/sys/shm.h in Linux. 
b. Messages 
Table 3-2 shows the messaging IPC mechanisms.  The XTS-300 mechanisms  
can only run in the OSS domain (Ring 2). Therefore, they are translated to POSIX.1 
compliant mechanisms capable of running in the Linux user (Ring 3) domain. 
 
XTS-300  Linux Translation 
send_ipc_message(procuid id, 
ring target ring,  
bool upgrade_allowed,  
ipc_event_type message_type,  
far const void *data, sizet data size); 
msgsnd(int msgid,  
const void *ptr,  
size_t nbytes,  
int flag;) 
receive_ipc_message(_far ipc_event_type 
*message_type,  far procuid *sendingprocess, 
far ring *sending_ring, far void *data, far size_t 
*data_size); 
msgrcv(int msgid,  
void *ptr,  
size_t nbytes,  
long type, 
int flag) 




The semget and semop IPC mechanisms are available for both OSS domains  
and Application domain programs.  The only major change with semaphores is that the 
union variable  
semun{int val; sem_ds *buf;unsigned short *array}sem_arg;  
was added in /util/msem.c.  Also external functions semget(ket_t, int,int) , 
semop(int,sem_operation, int), and semctl(int, int, int, union semun arg) are commented out 
because there is no advantage declaring these as external functions when all references to 
them can be made via declarations in the /include/msem.h header file. 
4. Access Control 
 SSS programs must take on the user/group access class of the user of the TCBE.  In 
order to accomplish this, the XTS-300 kernel call (TCB-Gate) set_user_group(ushort euid, 
ushort egid,ushort ruid, ushort, rgid) is used.  This function sets the real and effective 
user/group identifiers for the current process.  In the port to Linux, the function is replaced 
with setuid(uid_t uid).  If groups need to be addressed, the setgid(gid_t gid) may be used. 
5. Variables 
The GNU C compiler  (gcc) in Linux returned numerous errors during the porting 
process because function-local variables were not declared at the beginning of the functions. 
This problem was resolved by placing local variable declarations at the beginning of 
functions. 
There are many variable types declared in the XTS-300 STOP directory header files 
that are also declared in Linux header files. When such conflicts developed, the XTS-300 
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declared variables were commented out in favor of Linux declarations, many of which are 
declared in  /usr/include/sys/types.h. 
 
6. Processes 
In Linux, the fork() function is used to create a child process. The XTS-300 uses  
fork_process().  However, the exact semantics of how it works, how much of the parent's 
environment, and how many of its facilities are inherited by the child process are the same 
as those for the Linux mechanism.   
 The XTS-300 load_process() TCB gate (system call) provides the mechanism for 
starting a process with a new personality.   Linux does not have a load_process() system 
call, therefore a fork()/exec() sequence was used to obtain the equivalent results. 
 
7. Networking 
The XTS-300’s OSS Domain uses the socket library (libsocket) for client/server 
communications by specifying the –lsocket argument when compiling.  However, when 
ported to Linux, this library is not required and all of the socket functions are in Linux’s 
libc.a library in directory /usr/lib/libc.a. 
8. Reference and Debug File Locations 




D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an analysis of the major issues associated with porting from 
the XTS-300 to Linux, highlighting the differences between the interfaces of the two 
systems.   
In theory, UNIX applications ported to the Linux operating system can be completed 
with very little effort.  However, the XTS-300 implements various Signals and IPCs that are 
specific to its TCB, thus not a found in POSIX implementations.  These program 
communication mechanisms elicit the majority of changes when porting from the XTS-300 
to Linux. 
The port environments are outlined in Table 3-3. 
 Linux XTS-300 
Kernel 2.2.16-22 STOP 4.4.2 
C Library libc 2.192 Non-standard 
Compiler  gcc 2.96-54 (which gcc; rpm 
–qf /usr/bin/gcc), based on 
GNU CC 2.95.2 
Non-standard  
Editor GNU emacs 20.7.1 N/A 
API Mostly Compliant with 
POSIX.1 
UNIX  
System V version 3 
C Standard ANSI C ANSI C 
Operating System Red-Hat Linux 7.0 XTS-300 
Java Runtime Environment J2sdk-1.4.0 (needed for  
TCBE test client) 
N/A 
Processor Type Pentium III 700 (i686) Pentium 75Mhz 





IV. PORTED MECHANISMS 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF PORTED SERVERS 
1. TCB Extension Server 
This section provides a synopsis of the TCB Extension Server description  
provided by Wilson,  [Ref. 1].    
The Naval Postgraduate School previously developed the TCB Extension 
Server process.   As shown in Figure 1.1, its purpose is to extend the TCB perimeter 
securely over the network to the requesting TCBE-equipped workstation.  The TCB 
Extension Server process is comprised of a single parent and multiple child processes that 
are responsible for accepting connections from the TCBE-equipped client workstations.  
The parent process will initially listen on an assigned port for  incoming secure attention key 
(SAK) requests initiated from the user at the remote TCBE-equipped client.  Once a request 
is received, the parent process will verify the identification and authorization of the 
requesting TCBE.  If the verification is successful, a child process is created and the parent 
is able to relinquish control of the communications to the child.   This frees the parent to 
listen for new connection requests.  If the Identification & Authorization is in error, the 
connection is terminated and no child is created [Ref. 4].   
Each TCBE connection to the MLS LAN is therefore assigned an individual  
child TCB Extension Server process that will handle all of the security-related operations 
necessary to establish and maintain a session on the MLS LAN.  The current MLS LAN 
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design enables the child process to present the user with menus, with which he or she may 
conduct all trusted path security related operations such as “login” and “session 
negotiation”.   This process also controls the actions of the connected TCBE through 
specific TCBE state commands.    At any time, the user make invoke the Secure Attention 
Key (SAK) which will prompt the TCB Extension Server to interrupt the current running 
process, verify the TCBE, and present an appropriate menu of trusted path operations.   
a.  TCB Extension Server on Linux 
In the XTS-300, the TCB Extension Server executes in the OSS domain,  
Ring 2 (where CASS and Trusted software execute), of the XTS-300.  However, the port to 
Linux requires execution of the TCB Extension Server is in the user domain, (Ring 3) using 
ported CASS domain services.  Yet, there are instances where OSS domain services will be 
required.  When OSS services are required, they need to be modified to run in the Linux 
environment.   
 
2.  Secure Session Server (SSS) 
  This section recaps the Secure Session Server description provided by Wilson  
[Ref. 1].    
Previously developed at The Naval Postgraduate School, the Secure Session Server 
process is comprised of a single parent and multiple child processes for each platform on 
which a given application protocol is hosted  The Secure Session Server parent process is 
responsible for accepting connections from TCBE-equipped client workstations and 
establishing the TCP/IP protocol services for the user.  Up to ten child processes can be used 
per session to service a connection for a parent SSS.  The parent process will initially listen 
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on an assigned port for incoming requests for protocol service.  Once a request is received, 
the parent processes will verify the user’s MLS LAN session with the User Database.  Each 
protocol service request is assigned an individual child Secure Session Server process that 
will handle all of the protocol transmissions to and from the Application Protocol Server.   
The child process is responsible for the creation of a unique Application Protocol Server 
process tied directly to the user through a handle created from the session data received from 
the Session Database Server (username, session level).   The User Database5 is used to bind 
communications from a particular TCBE to a specific user and session level [Ref. 4].   If the 
verification is successful, a child process is created, with a valid session, to service the 
connection.  This frees the parent to listen for new connection requests.  If the verification is 
in error, the connection is terminated and no child process is created. [Ref. 4]. 
a. Secure Session Server in Linux 
                                                
In the XTS-300, the Secure Session Server executes in the OSS domain, Ring  
2 (where CASS and Trusted software execute), of the XTS-300.  However, the port to Linux 
requires execution of the SSS executes in the user domain, (Ring 3) using ported CASS 
domain services.  Yet, there are instances where OSS domain services will be required.  
When OSS services are required, they need to be modified to run in the Linux environment.   
  Also, in the current Linux-based implementation, the Secure Session Server 
observes the session level in the User database.  In the current ported configuration, the 
session level indicates a security level four and integrity level zero.  However, the Linux 
 
5 This database is initialized (a new record will be created) each time a user on a valid TCBE logs in and  is 
updated when the user changes session level, or initiates a session.  The entry for a user is cleared when the user 
logs out. It is maintained (readable/writable) by the TCB Extension Server and shared (readable) by the SSS.  
The SSS reads this database to obtain the user name, session level, and session status, each time the SSS receives 
a protocol session request from a client.  
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operating system does not support security and integrity levels. Therefore, in the current 
port, the handle (descriptor) will be based only upon the socket creation between the remote 
client and the Secure Session Server.  The security and session levels may be re-
implemented if the SSS is ported to future Linux platform that supports those security 
mechanisms. 
B.   DESCRIPTION OF PORTED DATABASES 
The following lists of databases files are required for the port to the Linux 
environment.  They provide data necessary for the compilation and execution of the TCB 
Extension and SSS Servers.  The descriptions of the databases are from Shifflett [Ref. 4]. 
1.  proto_list 
The ‘Protocol DB’ is used to list the application protocols that will be  
provided by the MLS LAN.  The ‘Protocol DB’ will contain the following fields: 
• Protocol ID – a descriptive identifier of the protocol 
• Port Num – the TCP port number to listen to for service requests 
• Path – the path to the untrusted executable that encodes the protocol 
service (e.g. IMAP, sendmail, etc.) 
This database is: 
• Administratively set.   
• Used to start all necessary SSS processes  
• Managed by the ‘Allowed Protocols’ module. 
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2.   tcbe_list 
The ‘tcbe_list” file is a list of TCBEs that can be used to login to the MLS  
LAN TCB.  The ‘tcbe_list’ will contain the following fields: 
• TCBE ID – this field will be a unique identifier of the TCBE instance 
• A potential future enhancement would include session level minimum and 
maximum for each TCBE, and/or a list of users allowed using each TCBE. 
 
The TCB Extension Server will use this database to restrict login access (e.g. trusted 
path access) to the MLS LAN TCB. 
This database is administratively set and cannot be modified by the TCB Extension 
Server, or the SSS. 
This database will be read (cached) by the TCB Extension Server on startup. 
      This database will be managed by the ‘Allowed TCBE’ module. 
3.  pmap_db.txt 
The ‘Pseudo-Socket Map DB’ is used to map a particular user and session level to a 
Pseudo-Socket (PSKT).  This database will contain the following fields: 
• User ID – the ID of a user 
• Session level – the session level of the user 
• Handle – a handle to a PSKT. 
This database will be maintained by the SSS child processes.  Since this database is 
shared by multiple processes, a locking capability will be needed to prevent more than one 
SSS child process from allocating the same PSKT handle. 
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This database will be read-only by the protocol server processes that use it to obtain 
the PSKT handle. 
This database will be managed by the ‘PSKT Map’ module. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The Naval Postgraduate School previously developed the TCB Extension and Secure 
Session Servers for use on the XTS-300.   The TCB Extension Server’s purpose is to extend 
the TCB perimeter securely over the network to the requesting TCBE-equipped workstation.    
The SSS parent process is responsible for accepting connections from TCBE-equipped 
client workstations and establishing the TCP/IP protocol services for the user.   
In the XTS-300, both servers execute in the OSS domain.  In the Linux environment, 
they execute in the user domain, (Ring 3).   
There are also four database files that need to be copied to the Linux environment. 
These databases provide services such as users databases, allowed clients, allowed protocols 









V. SOURCE CODE TRANSFORMS TO LINUX ENVIRONMENT 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The ported software has the directory structure shown in Fig. 5-1.  All preprocessor 
directives and directory searches are made based upon this structure.   
Big programs are made up of many modules [3].  These modules provide the user 
with functions and data structures that are to be used in a program.  The modules in the port 
essentially come in two parts: the interface and implementation.  The interfaces that 
specifies what the TCB Extension and SSS modules do are located in the 
/home/mvglover/thesis/include and /home/mvglover/thesis/stop directories, while the 
implementations are specified in the /home/mvglover/thesis/tps, /home/mvglover/thesis/util 
and /home/mvglover/thesis/sss directories.  The interface declares all of the data types, 
function prototypes, global information, macros, or whatever the module requires. The 
implementation adheres to the specifications set forth by the interface.  This is how the 
XTS-300 port is designed.   
The ~/logs directory contains the databases required for the TCB Extension  and SSS 
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Compile/link/logical error Location Resolution Remarks 
 In /stop/message.h 
DAEMON_NAME undeclared  
 




CLK_TCK already defined in 
time.h.   
64 Commented out #define 
CLK_TCK 
CLK_TICK in 





Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
sss.c, received parse error that 
ulong not recognized 
Line 65 added #include 
</usr/include/sys/types.h> 
Used Linux ulong 
definition 
Structure access in /stop/access.h 










Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
FALSE redefined; already 
defined in 
/usr/include/sys/types.h 
55 Commented out and added 
#include 
</usr/include/sys/types.h> 
Warning, not error 
TRUE redefined; already 
defined in 
/usr/include/sys/types.h 
56 Commented out and added 
#include 
</usr/include/sys/types.h> 
Warning, not error 
ushort redefined; already 
defined in 
/usr/include/sys/types.h 
39 Commented out and added 
#include 
</usr/include/sys/types.h> 
Warning, not error 
ulong redefined; already defined 
in /usr/include/sys/types.h 
40 Commented out and added 
#include 
</usr/include/sys/types.h> 
Warning, not error 
 
 
2.   TCB Extension Server Module 
a. Makefile 
The –I../stop option was added to the INC_OSS and INC_CASS flags. 
 
The domain flags,  
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CFLAGS_OSS =  -oss -DOSS_OPTION    
CFLAGS_OSS_DAEMON = -oss -DOSS_OPTION –daemon -DIS_DAEMON  
were commented out so that source code that executes in the OSS domain will only use 
CASS domain services. 
In the tps and tpsd compile commands the –lsocket option was removed  
because this library is not required.  All of the socket functions are in Linux’s libc.a library 
in directory /usr/lib/libc.a. 
b. tps.c  
In tps.c, there are various OSS Domain Library functions that need to be  
changed to conform to Linux signals and messages. 
 
Compile/link/logical error Location Resolution Remarks 
  Added #include  “..stop/message.h”  














ATE_PROCESS_EVENT, NULL, 0); 








(_far procuid *)(&pid), 
(_far ring *)(&ring_num) 
(_far char *)data, 
(_far_size_t *)(&data_len)); 
265  msgrcv(((_far ipc_event_type 
*)(&e_type), 
(_far procuid *)(&pid), 
(_far ring *)(&ring_num) 
















c. tps_utilc.  
 
Compile/link/logical error Location Resolution Remarks 




  Added <time.h>  












*get_trusted_info    
 
 
   3.  INCLUDE 
a.     level.h 
In the XTS-300, the level.h header file is not in /include directory.  However,  
for the Linux port it was added because many of the access.h is dependent on level.h for 
many variable declarations. 
b.   userdb.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
parse errors in function prototype 
int user_logged_in() 
Line 118 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file. 
 
parse errors in function prototype 
int get_session_level() 
140 Same as above  
parse errors in function prototype 
int set_session_level() 
172 Same as above  
c.   util.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
 parse errors in function 
prototype char *disp_sess() 
Line 96 Added <access.h> to else block of 




parse errors in function prototype 
void get_network_level() 
104 Same as above  
parse errors in function prototype 
void_get_current_level() 
112 Same as above  
parse errors in function prototype 
int check_access() 
122 Same as above  
d.   msem.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
parse error before access_ma Lines 38,48 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
 
e.  pmap_db.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
parse error before access_ma Lines 
66,79,101,1
23 
Added <access.h> to else block 
of macro at beginning of file 
 
f. pskt.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
parse error before access_ma Line 62 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
 
g. shm.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
Parse error before access_ma 
when compiling user_ia.c 
Line 40 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
 
Parse error before access_ma 
During compile of shm.c 
Line 50,64 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
 
h. alw_tcbe.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 




Old path defined for 
XTS-300 
i. hrl_db.h 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
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parse error before access_ma Lines 
79,148 
Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
 
 
4.    UTIL Module 
a.   Makefile 
The domain flag,  
CFLAGS_OSS = -DOSS_OPTION 
was commented out so that source code that executes in the OSS domain only use CASS 
domain services.  
In order to build the lbutil_oss.a library, the –oss flag was removed.  This  
was done because of an error stating that  too many –c –o or –S flags in multiple 
compilations.   It seems that this error occurred because the compiler did not recognize the –
oss flag and thought that that the user was using the –o flag twice.   
The –oss flag is necessary so that the /stop directory and the liboss.a library  
can be utilized.   However, the Makefile was changed so that  /stop directory is searched, 
and the liboss.a library is not used in the Linux port.  Therefore the –oss flag is not 
necessary. 
b.   buff_io.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 




c.   menu.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
 parse errors idx Line 100   
 45
d.   msem.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
Conflicting types for semop() 
and semctl(), function prototypes 
75-77 Commented out semop(), 
semctl(), and semge()t external 
function declarations. 
Commented out 
external value semget() 
so of SYS V 
semaphore functions 
are used consistently 
Parse error before union, 
sem_arg undeclared 
178 Added union added semun{int 
val; sem_ds *buf;unsigned short 
*array}sem_arg; 
 
e.   pmap_db.c 
No Change 
f.   pskt.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
Dereferencing pointer to 
incomplete type 
Line 1257 commented out countdown = 
timeout->tv_sec 
 
Dereferencing pointer to 
incomplete type 
Line 1336 commented out countdown = 
timeout->tv_sec 
 
g.   shm.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
parse error for the shmid_ds  
in header file shm.h 
 Commented out <sys/shm.h> and 
specifically added 
</usr/include/sys/shm.h 
This also got rid of an 
error at lines 
115,189,265, that 
stated that ‘storage size 
of shmid_ds isn’t 
known. 
h.   alwe_tcbe.c 
No Change 
i.   priv_util.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
Parse error before access_ma Line 26 Added <access.h> to else block of 
macro at beginning of file 
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j.   user_db.c 
No Change 
k.   user_ia.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
‘uauth_entry’ undelcared 45 In the /stop/user_group.h file I 
commented out the if 
“SUBSYSTEM_DEF = = 
SS_TRUSTED || defined 
(NEED_AUTH)” 
 
Link Error when compiling tps.c: 








All source code that referred to privilege code was deleted since privileged  
code would not be run in the Linux environment.   
l.   util.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 




 Commented out section that 
addressed privilege code 
Need to get source 
code or library for 
these function call.  
Library is cass.a  
 
The getlevel() function call was deleted and  the include file  
</stop/access.h>  was added. 
5.    SSS Module 
a.   Makefile 
      The XTS-300 environment, the compiler used options flag –I 
/usr/include/sys, however this option is not required in the Linux environment because the 
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GNU gcc in Linux Redhat 7.0 by default searches for this directory path.  Also, –I../stop was 
added so that the /stop directory would be searched. 
The domain flags,  
CFLAGS_OSS = -DOSS_OPTION –daemon –DIS_DAEMON  
were commented out so that source code that executes in the OSS domain will only use 
CASS domain services.  
In the Makefile configuration file, getpwnam and getpwent are commented  
out, because the function calls are already defined in libc.a.   Also usr/libc is changed to 
conform to the Linux path /usr/include/libc.   
b.   sss.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
  Commented out sys/byteorder.h  
Undefined variable errors for 
NO_GROUP_CHANGE and 
NO_USER_CHANGE 












L,NULL,NULL)  undefined 
229 Replaced with sleep(.1); Link Error; 
Also 
ONE_SECOND 



































 Replaced with sleep(a)   
c.   sss_util.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location Resolution Remarks 
  Commented out sys/byteorder.h  
Error: variable-size type declared 
outside of any function in 
statement temp_buff[read_limit + 
1]; 
 Changed ‘read limit +1’ to 
‘4097’ 
 
Struct timeval was not defined  Added #include <time.h>  




Undefined variable errors for 
NO_GROUP_CHANGE and 
NO_USER_CHANGE 





EVENT,(_far const void *) 
NULL,0)…   undefined 




Args 2 and three from 
send_ipc_message are 

















318 Replaced with sleep(1); Link Error 
Also ONE_SECOND 
 is defined as 
1000000/128L in 
kernel.h 













189 Replaced with sleep(.5); Link Error 
Also ONE_SECOND 



















Link_error: undefined reference to 
load process( far const char 
*)my_aps_path,my_user_sess, 
FALSE, (_far short *)NULL,(_far 
procuid *)(&child_proc)); 
509 Used fork()/exec() sequence: 
if((child_proc = fork()) < 0){ 
   err_sys(“fork_error”); 
   done=TRUE; 
   } 
else if (child_proc == 0){ 
   if (execle((_far const char 
*)my_aps_path,NULL,NULL,N
ULL,NULL) < 0) 
   err_sys(“execle error”);…….  
load_process() is a 
TCB gate system call 
which requires the 
oss.a library, which not 




GNAL_EVENT, handler);  
540 Changed to 
sigaction((RAISE_SIGNAL_EV





























189 Replaced with sleep(1);  
  d.       ssd.c 
Compile/link/logical error Location  Resolution Remarks 
Commented out sys/byteorder.h    




 Will use sleep(a) function  





Line 131 Changed to the_err=setuid(pwent-
>uid); 
 




Line150 Changed to 
the_err=setuid(orig_uid); 
 










E. SUMMARY  
 The changes outlined in this chapter represent the major changes that were made to 
the ported modules so that compilation and linking could be executed. After the changes 
were made the TCB Extension and SSS servers had basic interoperability, however, MAC 
































VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The premise of this thesis has shown that the TCB Extension Server and Secure 
Session Server can be successfully ported to a Linux Environment.  Based upon this port, 
these are the findings. 
Because the Linux API has some backwards compatibility to the XTS-300 interface, 
it readily facilitated many of the services of the XTS-300. Most of the difficulties that were 
encountered were due to interfaces requiring services specific to the XTS-300 or when some 
CASS functionality depended on Trusted Services. 
Now that it has been demonstrated that the Linux environment can run and support 
many of the TCB Extension Server and SSS functionalities, many modern OS support of 
functionalities such as concurrency, multiprocessor support, etc. can be supported in a future 
implementation.   
The Linux kernel will need to incorporate some additional internal dependencies in 
order to support MAC polices in the TCB Extension Server and Secure Session Server.  The 
current security policy enforcement in Linux is based upon a minimal DAC policy.  
Therefore the current port to Linux does not support the security policy enforcement 




B.   LINUX SECURITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 
There are many challenges in extending Linux’s functionality to support a secure 
operating system.  The most straightforward attempt would be to use a micro-kernel kernel 
based approach.  Micro-kernel operating systems demand a very small set of functions from 
the kernel, generally including a few synchronization primitives, a simple scheduler, and 
interprocess communications mechanisms [Ref. 8].   However even this approach presents 
some serious challenges, because of Linux’s current kernel size and hardware abstraction. 
The Linux kernel is monolithic.  It is a large, complex program, composed of several 
logically different components,[Ref. 8], and large kernel data structures.  There are 
approximately 1.5 million source lines of code in *.c, *.h, and *.S files.  Therefore verifying 
that the kernel correctly enforces the protection requirements of the security model means 
examining all possible violations of kernel security.  This would be a daunting task.  
Also Linux’s hardware abstraction is designed to support only two execution modes, 
user and kernel. There are no intermediate domains that can run trusted processes that 
implement trusted functions but do not need to be part of the policy enforcement mechanism 
of the kernel.  Based upon the current architecture, if trusted processes are to run either the 
kernel size has to be increased or the trusted process has to be a user domain process. 
C.  PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
There did not appear to be any degradation in performance of the TCB Extension 
Server and SSS when run in the Linux environment.  However, quantification of the 
performance is imprecise since the XTS-300 is running on Pentium verses a Pentium III in 
the Linux environment.  Even so, Linux should perform better, because the XTS-300 
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implements a security kernel, thus yielding some performance advantages in comparison to 
Linux.  For example, the XTS-300 adds further intermediate levels (Rings 1,2) between the 
user and OS resources causing more explicit message passing.   Moreover, it is difficult to 
implement a smaller and less complex Linux kernel that can isolate the necessary security 
functions (i.e. dependencies exist in the XTS-300 between security and nonsecurity 
functions -- CASS and Trusted Software).   
D.  FUTURE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  Security Enabled Linux 
A vast amount of research and development has gone into extending UNIX- 
like systems to support security needs of various communities.  In addition to the XTS-300, 
several other UNIX-like systems have been extended to support the U.S. military's desire for 
multilevel security.    
Research using a Linux-based approach is new.   However, there are a few  
promising efforts with Linux systems for creating restricted execution environments, with 
many different approaches.  
The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has developed Security-Enhanced Linux 
(Flask), which supports defining a security policy in a specialized language and then 
enforces that policy.   
Medusa DS9, is a free open project that extends Linux by supporting, at the kernel 
level, a user-space authorization server. Another open project, LIDS, is a kernel patch and 
admin tool to enhance the Linux kernel security by attempting to Implement a reference 
monitor concept and MAC policy in the kernel. 
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 The Rule Set Based Access Control system for Linux (RSBAC) is based on the 
Generalized Framework for Access Control (GFAC) by Abrams and LaPadula and provides 
a flexible system of access control based on several kernel modules.     
An addition, an NPS effort presents a Linux-based approach to provide system 
supporting MAC policies in a Linux environment.  This security-enhanced Linux specifies 
the implementation of label-based interfaces for the mandatory portions of the Bell and 
Lapadula secrecy model and Biba integrity model [Ref. 21]. 
2.  IPSEC Capabilites 
Another goal is to implement IPsec.  The results of this effort can be conducted in 
the context of a larger research project to provide highly protected communication channels 
between Clients and Servers for security critical and mission critical information transfers.  
It also follows work from [Ref. 1]. 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
The port of the TCB Extension Server and SSS to the Linux platform was a success. 
The port process came with positive and negative experiences. The TCB Extension Server 
and SSS source code was well commented and the debugging code was very useful.  
However, knowing what modules and databases to port took a little time.  This was based 
primarily because of the author’s inexperience with porting software. Using emacs as the 
development environment made the work easier.  Built in functions such as compilation, 
debugging, Current Version System (CVS) and speed-bar were very useful.  The overall 
experience from this thesis was very positive, thanks to the talented team of NPS personnel 
that supported and helped the author.  
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APPENDIX A.   GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Access: A specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that results in the 
flow of information from one to the other. 
 
API: Application Programming Interface; the generalized term for a defined software 
interface for software applications. 
 
Authenticate: To establish the validity of a claimed security. 
 
Bell-LaPadula Model: A formal state transition model of computer security policy that 
describes a set of access control rules. In this formal model, the entities in a computer 
system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. The notion of a secure state 
is defined and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from 
secure state to secure state; thus, inductively proving that the system is secure. A system 
state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects 
are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to determine whether or not a 
specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the 
classification of the object and a determination is made as to whether the subject is 
authorized for the specific access mode. 
 
BSD Berkeley System Distribution: A version of UNIX based on the AT&T System V 
UNIX developed by the Computer System Research Group of the University of 
California at Berkeley. 
 
Capability: The ability of a process to perform certain functions. This function allows 
kernel programs, running as root, to drop all special root privileges or capabilities. For 
instance an FTP server could start as root, then drop all root-specific capabilities except 
the capability to open low-numbered ports such as port 20, the default FTP-DATA port. 
 
Compartment: Think of a compartment as a container for objects and a permission for 
subjects. For instance, if we have a compartment for "unclassified" data, and a 
compartment for "secret" data, people with access to the "unclassified" compartment 
would not be able to access data labeled as "secret" and visa versa. People with access to 
both compartments could access both sets of data. 
 
Data Integrity: The state that exists when computerized data is the same as that in the 
source documents and has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or 
destruction. 
 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC): Users are able to change the permissions or 
compartments of information at their discretion if they have control over the object 
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containing the information. For instance a user with administrator access could allow an 
unprivileged user access to the system's shadow password file by changing the file 
permissions. 
 
Domain: The set of objects that a subject has the ability to access. 
 
Free Software Foundation (FSF): A tax-exempt charity that raises funds for work on 
the GNU Project. 
 
GNU General Public License (GPL): The GNU Project was launched in 1984 to 
develop a complete Unix-like operating system which is free software: the GNU system. 
(GNU is a recursive acronym for ``GNU's Not Unix''; it is pronounced "guh-NEW".) 
 
Host: The generalized term for any device that can be a source or sink of information on 
a network. Generally, a host is a single-networked computer. 
 
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force; the body associated with the Internet that 
recommends and approves "standards" for use on the Internet. 
 
IP: Internet Protocol; the network layer (layer 3) of TCP/IP. Network layer addresses are 
used by routers for routing purposes. 
 
IPC: Inter-process Communication. Linux supports signals, pipes and the System V IPC 
mechanisms named after the UNIX release in which they first appeared. 
 
IPSEC: Internet Protocol Security. An extension to TCP/IP, which allows encryption to 
protect all of the traffic between hosts. Free/SWAN is the beginnings of a Linux IPSEC 
project. 
 
kernel thread (daemon):  a kernel thread is a process that runs in kernel mode. These 
processes are properly part of the kernel since they have access to all of the kernel’s data 
structures and functions, but they are treated as separate processes that can be suspended 
and resumed. Kernel threads do not have virtual memory, but access the same physical 
memory as the rest of the kernel. 
 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) - The system enforces access to information based 
on the information’s sensitivity level or other criteria. So if the shadow password file 
mentioned above was labeled "Secret", the administrator could not allow a normal 
unprivileged user access to the file unless that administrator had special permission to 
change the file's attributes. 
 
Object - A passive entity that contains or receives information. Access to an object 
potentially implies access to the information it contains. Examples of objects are: records, 
blocks, pages, segments, files, directories, directory trees, and programs, as well as bits, 





 International Standards Organization (OSI) Model: A seven-layer model of data 
communications protocols standardized by the ISO. 
 
Process: A program in execution. It is completely characterized by a single current 
execution point (represented by the machine state) and address space. 
 
Rainbow Series - A set of U.S. Government books on information security topics, so-
called because each volume had a different colored cover. Some are available on-line at: 
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/ 
 
Red Book - The Trusted Networking Implementation (TNI). A criteria for building 
TCSEC systems in a network environment, as well as trusted networks. 
 
RFC: Request for Comment; the document that the IETF uses to define standards for use 
and recommend practices in the Internet. 
 
setuid, seteuid: The system calls under UNIX and UNIX-like systems such as Linux that  
allow a process to change the ID it runs under. 
 
Secure Session Server:  A process comprised of a single parent and multiple child 
processes for each platform on which a given application protocol is hosted.  The Secure 
Session Server parent process is responsible for accepting connections from TCBE-
equipped client workstations and establishing the TCP/IP protocol services for the user. 
Security Kernel: The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a Trusted 
Computing Base that implement the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all 
accesses, be protected from modification, and be verifiable as correct.  
Security Level: The combination of a hierarchical classification and a set of non-
hierarchical categories that represents the sensitivity of information.  
Security Policy: The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an organization 
manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
Subject: A subject on the system is basically a user, process or other active entity. 
 
System V: A version of UNIX developed by the Bell Laboratories of AT&T.. 
 
TCP/IP: The protocol suite used in the Internet. The most important protocol suite used 
in networking. 
 
TCB Extension Server: A server process comprised of a single parent and multiple child 




Trojan Horse: A computer program with an apparently or actually useful function that 
contains additional (hidden) functions that surreptitiously exploit the legitimate 
authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment of security. For example, making 
a "blind copy" of a sensitive file for the creator of the Trojan Horse.  
Trusted Computer System: A system that employs sufficient hardware and software 
integrity measures to allow its use for processing simultaneously a range of sensitive or 
classified information. 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB): The totality of protection mechanisms within a 
computer system -- including hardware, firmware, and software -- the combination of 
which is responsible for enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more 
components that together enforce a unified security policy over a product or system. The 
ability of a trusted computing base to correctly enforce a security policy depends solely 
on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct input by system administrative 
personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to the security policy.  
Trusted Path: A mechanism by which a person at a terminal can communicate directly 
with the Trusted Computing Base. This mechanism can only be activated by the person 
or the Trusted Computing Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted software.  
Trusted Software: The software portion of a Trusted Computing Base. 
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